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To achieve security in wireless sensor networks, it is important to be able to encrypt and authenticate messages
sent between sensor nodes. Before doing so, keys for performing encryption and authentication must be agreed
upon by the communicating parties. Due to resource constraints, however, achieving key agreement in wireless
sensor networks is non-trivial. Many key agreement schemes used in general networks, such as Diffie-Hellman
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elegant key pre-distribution approaches have been proposed recently.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Recent advances in electronic and computer technologies have paved the way for the pro-
liferation of wireless sensor networks (WSNs). Sensor networks usually consist of a large
number of ultra-small autonomous devices. Each device, called a sensor node, is battery
powered and equipped with integrated sensors, data processing capabilities, and short-
range radio communications. In typical application scenarios, sensor nodes are spread ran-
domly over the terrain under scrutiny and collect sensor data. Examples of sensor network
projects include SmartDust [Kahn et al. 1999] and WINS.1
Sensor networks are being deployed for a wide variety of applications [Akyildiz et al.
2002], including military sensing and tracking, environment monitoring, patient monitor-
ing and tracking, smart environments, etc. When sensor networks are deployed in a hostile
environment, security becomes extremely important, as these networks are prone to differ-
ent types of malicious attacks. For example, an adversary can easily listen to the traffic,
impersonate one of the network nodes, or intentionally provide misleading information to
other nodes. To provide security, communication should be encrypted and authenticated.
The open problem is how to bootstrap secure communications between sensor nodes, i.e.
how to set up secret keys between communicating nodes.
This problem is known as the key agreement problem, which has been widely studied in
general network environments. There are three types of general key agreement schemes:
trusted-server schemes, public-key schemes, and key pre-distribution schemes. Trusted-
server schemes depend on a trusted server for key agreement between nodes; an example
is Kerberos [Neuman and Tso 1994]. This type of scheme is not suitable for sensor net-
works because in the locations where WSNs are deployed, one cannot generally assume
that any trusted infrastructure is in place. Public-key schemes depend on asymmetric cryp-
tography and require some sort of public-key infrastructure to be in place; an example
of such schemes is an authenticated key agreement protocol using public-key certificates.
However, as pointed out by Perrig, et al. [Perrig et al. 2001], the limited computation and
energy resources of sensor nodes often make it undesirable to use public-key algorithms
in WSNs. A third way to establish keys is via pre-distribution, where (secret) key infor-
mation is distributed to all sensor nodes prior to deployment. Such schemes seem most
appropriate for WSNs.
If it is known which nodes will be in the same neighborhood before deployment, pair-
wise keys can be established between these nodes (and only these nodes) a priori. How-
ever, most sensor network deployments are random; thus, such a priori knowledge about
the topology of the network does not exist. A number of key pre-distribution schemes do
not rely on prior knowledge of the network topology. A naive solution is to let all nodes
store an identical master secret key. Any pair of nodes can use this master secret key to
securely establish a new pairwise key. However, this scheme does not exhibit desirable net-
work resilience: if a single node is compromised, the security of the entire sensor network
is compromised. Some existing studies suggest storing the master key in tamper-resistant
hardware to reduce the risk, but this increases the cost and energy consumption of each
sensor. Furthermore, tamper-resistant hardware might not always be safe [Anderson and
Kuhn 1996].
At the other extreme, one might consider a key pre-distribution scheme in which each
1Wireless Integrated Network Sensors, University of California. See: http://www.janet.ucla.edu/WINS.
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sensor stores N − 1 keys, each of which is known to only one other sensor node (here, we
let N denote the total number of nodes in the network). This scheme guarantees perfect
resilience because any number of compromised nodes does not affect the security of any
uncompromised pairs of nodes. Unfortunately, this scheme is impractical for sensors with
an extremely limited amount of memory because N could be large. Moreover, adding
new nodes to a pre-existing sensor network is difficult when using this scheme because the
existing nodes do not have the new nodes’ keys.
Recently, two key pre-distribution schemes suited for sensor networks have been pro-
posed. Eschenauer and Gligor [Eschenauer and Gligor 2002] proposed a random key pre-
distribution scheme which may be summarized as follows: before deployment, each sensor
node receives a random subset of keys from a large key pool; to agree on a key for commu-
nication, two nodes find a common key (if any) within their subsets and use that key as their
shared secret key. Now, the existence of a shared key between a particular pair of nodes
is not certain but is instead guaranteed only with some probability (which can be tuned by
adjusting the parameters of the scheme). Eschenauer and Gligor note that this does not
present an insurmountable problem as long as any two nodes can securely communicate
via a sequence of secure links; see Sections 4 and 7 for further discussion.
Based on this scheme, Chan, Perrig, and Song [Chan et al. 2003] proposed a general-
ized “q-composite” scheme which improves the resilience of the network (for the same
amount of key storage) and requires an attacker to compromise many more nodes in order
to compromise any additional communication. The difference between this scheme and the
previous scheme is that the q-composite scheme requires two nodes to find q (with q > 1)
keys in common before deriving a shared key and establishing a secure communication
link. It is shown that, by increasing the value of q, network resilience against node capture
is improved for certain ranges of other parameters [Chan et al. 2003].
1.1 Main Contributions
The primary contribution of this work is a new key pre-distribution scheme which offers
improved network resilience (for the same storage constraints) compared to the existing
schemes mentioned above. The scheme requires more computation than previous schemes,
but we show that this extra computation is small compared to that required by public-key
schemes. We provide a thorough theoretical analysis of the security of our scheme, as well
as its associated overhead. A high-level overview of this scheme, and a discussion of its
advantages, appears below. As part of our analysis of the security of this scheme, we also
introduce a rigorous framework (i.e., formal definitions of security) appropriate for analyz-
ing key pre-distribution schemes for wireless sensor networks. Somewhat surprisingly, we
found that prior definitions of security for key pre-distribution schemes were insufficient
for our intended application; thus, we believe our framework is of independent interest and
should prove useful for further work in this area.
Our key pre-distribution scheme extends and improves upon Blom’s key pre-distribution
scheme [Blom 1985] by combining this scheme with the random key pre-distribution meth-
ods discussed previously. Blom proposed a key pre-distribution scheme that allows any
pair of nodes to find a secret pairwise key between them. Compared to the “trivial” scheme
mentioned earlier in which each node stores (N − 1) keys, Blom’s scheme only requires
nodes to store λ+1 keys, where λ¿ N . The tradeoff is that, unlike the (N−1)-pairwise-
key scheme, Blom’s scheme is not perfectly resilient against node capture. Instead it has
the following λ-secure property: as long as an adversary compromises at most λ nodes,
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uncompromised nodes are perfectly secure. When an adversary compromises more than λ
nodes, all pairwise keys in the entire network are compromised.
The threshold λ can be treated as a security parameter in that selection of a larger λ
leads to a more secure network. This threshold property of Blom’s scheme is a desirable
feature because an adversary needs to attack a significant fraction of the network in order to
achieve high payoff. However, λ also determines the amount of memory required to store
key information, as increasing λ leads to higher memory usage. The goal of our scheme is
to increase the network’s resilience against node capture in a probabilistic sense (and not
in a perfect sense, as in the Blom scheme) without using too much memory.
Blom’s scheme uses a single key space to ensure that any pair of nodes can compute
a shared key. Motivated by the random key pre-distribution schemes presented previ-
ously [Eschenauer and Gligor 2002; Chan et al. 2003], we propose a new scheme using
multiple key spaces. That is, we first construct ω spaces using Blom’s scheme, and each
sensor node carries key information from τ (2 ≤ τ < ω) randomly selected key spaces.
Now (by the properties of the underlying Blom scheme), if two nodes carry key informa-
tion from a common space, they can compute a pairwise key. Of course, it is no longer
certain that two nodes can generate a pairwise key (as in Blom’s scheme); instead (as in
previous random key pre-distribution schemes), we have only a probabilistic guarantee
that this will be possible. Our analysis shows that using the same amount of memory (and
for the same probability of deriving a shared key), our new scheme is substantially more
resilient than previous probabilistic key pre-distribution schemes.
To further improve the resilience of our approach while maintaining connectivity of the
network, we develop a two-hop-neighbor key pre-distribution scheme. The idea is to let the
direct neighbor of a sender forward messages, so that nodes that are two hops away from
the sender can also receive them. The nodes that are two hops away are known as two-hop
neighbors. Treating two-hop neighbors as “direct” neighbors, the number of neighbors of
each sender increases fourfold. The consequence is that the resilience threshold can be
improved as well. Our results show that under certain conditions, the threshold can be
improved by a factor of four compared to our initial scheme.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our proposed
framework for analyzing the security of key pre-distribution schemes in terms of their ef-
fectiveness in establishing “secure channels” between the network nodes.2 We also show
a simple method to convert any secure key pre-distribution scheme into a scheme for es-
tablishing secure channels. Section 3 reviews Blom’s key pre-distribution scheme which
will be used as a building block for our main key pre-distribution scheme, described in
Section 4. Section 5 rigorously quantifies the resilience of our scheme to node capture,
and compares our scheme with existing key pre-distribution schemes. Section 6 presents
the communication and computation overheads of our scheme. Section 7 describes our
two-hop-neighbor key pre-distribution scheme. We conclude in Section 8.
1.2 Other Related Work
The Eschenauer-Gligor scheme [Eschenauer and Gligor 2002] and the Chan-Perrig-Song
scheme [Chan et al. 2003] have been reviewed earlier in this section. Detailed comparisons
with these two schemes will be given in Section 5.
Blundo et al. proposed several schemes allowing any group of n parties to compute
2Interestingly, secure key pre-distribution is necessary, but not sufficient, for establishing secure channels.
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a common key which is perfectly secret with respect to any coalition of t other par-
ties [Blundo et al. 1993]. When n = 2, their main scheme may be viewed as a special case
of Blom’s scheme [Blom 1985], which is reviewed in Section 3. Although both Blom’s
scheme (for n = 2) and the main scheme of Blundo, et al. (for arbitrary n) match the
known lower bound [Blundo et al. 1993] in terms of their memory usage for any desired
resilience t, we stress that this lower bound holds only when (1) all groups of size n must
be able to compute a shared key and (2) the network must be perfectly resilient to at most t
captured nodes. By relaxing these requirements (slightly) and considering the probabilistic
analogues of the above, we obtain more memory-efficient schemes.
Perrig et al. proposed SPINS [Perrig et al. 2001], a security architecture in which each
sensor node shares a secret key with a base station. In this scheme, two sensor nodes cannot
directly establish a secret key; however, they can set up a shared key using the base station
as a trusted third party. The scheme described in this work does not rely on any trusted
parties after nodes have been deployed.
A similar approach to the one described in this paper was independently developed by
Liu and Ning [Liu and Ning 2003], which was published at the same time as the conference
version of this paper [Du et al. 2003]. Compared to [Liu and Ning 2003], this paper pro-
vides a more thorough theoretical security analysis and communication overhead analysis;
we also introduce a rigorous framework (i.e., formal definitions of security) appropriate for
analyzing key pre-distribution schemes for wireless sensor networks. Moreover, we also
describe a further improvement using multi-hop neighbors.
2. A SECURITY FRAMEWORK FOR KEY PRE-DISTRIBUTION SCHEMES
Before describing our primary scheme in detail, we first propose a general framework in
which to analyze the security of key pre-distribution schemes in general. Our starting
point is the following simple observation (which, however, we found lacking in previous
work): the goal of a key pre-distribution scheme is not simply to distribute keys, but rather
to distribute keys which can then be used to secure network communication. While the
former is necessary for the latter, it is decidedly not sufficient. As an example, we show
below that although the Eschenauer-Gligor scheme ensures that the key Kij established by
some pair of nodes i and j remains unknown to an adversary (with high probability, for
some fraction of compromised nodes), the scheme is insecure if Kij is used to authenticate
the communication between these nodes. Related problems arise in the schemes of Blom,
Blundo, et al., and Chan-Perrig-Song, as well. This observation emphasizes the importance
of precise definitions of security, as well as rigorous proofs in some well-defined model.
We develop the framework as follows: We first define key pre-distribution schemes, and
describe for such schemes a “basic” level of security. This definition (informally) cap-
tures the idea that an adversary should be unable to determine the key shared by some
pair of users (except with low probability), and roughly corresponds to the level of secu-
rity considered in previous work in this area. We then define a stronger notion of security
which we believe more accurately represents the level of security expected from key pre-
distribution schemes when used in practice. We focus specifically on the case of message
authentication, yet our results easily extend to the case of pairwise encryption. Our defini-
tion (informally) requires that an adversary be unable to insert a bogus message which is
accepted as legitimate by one of the nodes (except with low probability). Schemes meeting
this, more stringent notion of security are said to achieve secure pairwise authentication.
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After introducing these definitions, we show that a scheme meeting the “basic” notion
of security does not necessarily achieve secure pairwise authentication. On a more positive
note, we show a simple way to convert any scheme achieving the “basic” level of security
to one which does achieve secure pairwise authentication.
Our definitions, as well as our results, are described here in a relatively informal fashion.
Yet, it should be straightforward for the interested reader to derive formal definitions and
statements of our results from the discussion below.
We begin with a discussion of key pre-distribution schemes. We view such schemes
as being composed of algorithms for key generation, key distribution, and key derivation.
In the randomized key generation phase, some master secret information S is established.
Given S and a node identity i, a deterministic key distribution algorithm generates infor-
mation ki which will be stored by node i. Finally, during the key derivation phase, two
distinct nodes i and j holding ki and kj , respectively, execute an algorithm Derive and
output a shared key Kij ∈ {0, 1}` or ⊥ if no such key can be established. We denote exe-
cution of this algorithm by node i (holding information ki) as Derive(ki, i, j); we always
require Derive(ki, i, j) = Derive(kj , j, i). We assume the key derivation stage is deter-
ministic, but allow that it may require interaction between nodes i and j. Note that a pair
of nodes i, j is not guaranteed to be able to establish a shared key Kij 6=⊥. We assume
that the probability (over choice of master key S) that i and j can establish a shared key is
the same for any i 6= j, and refer to this as the connectivity (denoted by p) of the scheme.
We define our “basic” level of security via the following game: Fix node identities i
and j, and run an instance of the key pre-distribution scheme. An adversary is given the
information {ki1 , . . . , kit} for t randomly-selected nodes, where neither i nor j are in
the set {i1, . . . , it} (this models adversarial compromise of these nodes, with concomi-
tant exposure of the secret information stored thereon). The adversary “succeeds” if: (1)
Kij 6=⊥, and (2) the adversary can successfully output the key Kij . We will say that a
key pre-distribution scheme is (t, ²)-secure if, for any i, j, the probability that an adversary
succeeds is at most ². (In the above formulation, we have not restricted the computational
abilities of the adversary in any way. Clearly, this relaxation can also be considered.)
Note that meaningful security is obtained only when ² < p, since the first condition (i.e.,
Kij 6=⊥) only holds with probability p.
Before introducing a more useful notion of security, we define a pairwise authentication
scheme. This is simply a key pre-distribution scheme with an additional message authenti-
cation algorithm Mac and message verification algorithm Vrfy. Now, if nodes i, j establish
a shared key Kij 6=⊥, node i can authenticate its communication to node j as follows (j
can authenticate its communication to i similarly): before sending message m, node i
computes tag = MacKij (m) and sends tag along with m; upon receiving (m, tag), node
j accepts m only if VrfyKij (m, tag) = 1. For completeness, we define Mac⊥(m) =⊥ for
all m, and Vrfy⊥(m, tag) = 0 for all m, tag.
We now define secure pairwise authentication via the following game: Fix i and j, and
run an instance of the pairwise authentication scheme. An adversary is given {ki1 , . . . , kit}
as before. Additionally, the adversary can repeatedly make an unlimited number of mes-
sage authentication requests of the form Mac(i′, j′,m), with the effect that node i′ authen-
ticates messagem for node j′ (using keyKij) and returns the resulting tag to the adversary.
(We stress that i′, j′ ∈ {i, j} is allowed). Finally, the adversary outputs (m∗, tag∗) and
“succeeds” if: (1) VrfyKij (m∗, tag∗) = 1 (in particular, this will require Kij 6=⊥), and
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(2) the adversary had never requestedMac(i, j,m∗) orMac(j, i,m∗). Success corresponds
to the adversary “inserting” the bogus message m∗ which is accepted as valid by one of
i, j even though neither node authenticated this message. Finally, we say that a scheme
is a (t, ²)-secure pairwise authentication scheme if, for any (i, j), the probability that a
polynomial-time adversary succeeds in the above game is at most ². Note that we must
now limit the computational abilities of the adversary since secure message authentication
for an unbounded number of messages is impossible otherwise.
It is instructive to note that a key pre-distribution scheme secure in the basic sense need
not be a secure pairwise authentication scheme. For example, consider a scheme in which
Kij is equal to Ki′j′ (for some (i′, j′) 6= (i, j)) with some high (i.e., non-negligible)
probability; this is true for both the Eschenauer-Gligor and Chan-Perrig-Song schemes.
Now, even if an adversary does not compromise any nodes, and even if it cannot guess
Kij (and hence the scheme remains secure in the basic sense), the scheme is not a secure
pairwise authentication scheme. In particular, an adversary can take messages that were
authenticated by i′ and intended for j′, and send these messages to j while claiming they
originated from i; with high probability (namely, whenever Ki′j′ = Kij), the adversary’s
insertion goes undetected.
This problem of “repeated keys” has been noticed (although informally) in previous
work. However, we stress that subtle problems may arise even when the probability of
“repeated keys” is small. Whenever the keys used by different pairs of parties are not
independent (in a probabilistic sense), a formal proof of secure pairwise authentication
will not be possible in general. In fact, this reflects a serious potential vulnerability, as
the presence of dependent keys leaves open the possibility of related-key attacks on the
message authentication code or the lower-level primitives (i.e., block ciphers) from which
the MAC is constructed. The possibility of such related-key attacks also rules out the easy
“fix” in which nodes pre-pend the identities of the sender/receiver to any authenticated
messages; this does nothing to prevent related-key attacks.
Given the above, one should focus on designing secure pairwise authentication schemes
rather than secure key pre-distribution schemes. Luckily, it is simple to derive the former
from the latter as follows: Let Kij be the key derived by nodes i and j in some key pre-
distribution scheme which is assumed to be secure in the basic sense discussed above.
These nodes then compute K ′ij = H(i, j,Kij), where H is a hash function modeled as a
random oracle [Bellare and Rogaway 1993]. This key K ′ij is then used by i and j (as the
key for any secure MAC) to authenticate their communication as suggested above. It can
be shown that if the initial scheme is (t, ²)-secure in the basic sense, and if the probability
of forgery for the MAC is ²′, then the modified scheme is a (t, q² + ²′)-secure pairwise
authentication scheme, where q is a bound on the number of hash function queries made
by an adversary. The proof is straightforward, and is omitted here.
Since one may always convert any secure key pre-distribution scheme into a secure
pairwise authentication scheme, we will analyze the security of our proposed scheme in
the “basic” sense with the understanding that the above transformation should be applied
before the scheme is used in practice. This modular analysis of security is (we believe)
simpler, more intuitive, and less prone to error.
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3. BACKGROUND: BLOM’S KEY PRE-DISTRIBUTION SCHEME
Blom proposed a key pre-distribution method that allows any pair of nodes in a network
to be able to derive a pairwise secret key [Blom 1985]. As long as no more than λ nodes
are compromised, the network is perfectly secure (we call this the λ-secure property). We
briefly describe how Blom’s λ-secure key pre-distribution system works (we have made
some slight modifications to the scheme in order to make it more suitable for sensor net-
works, for the essential features remain unchanged).
During the pre-deployment phase, the base station first constructs a (λ+ 1)×N matrix
G over a finite field GF (q), where N is the size of the network and q > N . Matrix G
is public information; any sensor can know the contents of G, and even adversaries are
allowed to know G. Then the base station creates a random (λ+ 1)× (λ+ 1) symmetric
matrix D over GF (q), and computes an N×(λ+1) matrix A = (D ·G)T , where (D ·G)T
is the transpose of D ·G. Matrix D needs to be kept secret, and should not be disclosed to
adversaries or any sensor node (although, as will be discussed later, one row of (D · G)T
will be disclosed to each sensor node). Because D is symmetric, it is easy to see:
A ·G = (D ·G)T ·G = GT ·DT ·G = GT ·D ·G
= (A ·G)T .
This means thatA·G is a symmetric matrix. If we letK = A·G, we know thatKij = Kji,
where Kij is the element in K located in the ith row and jth column. We use Kij (or Kji)
as the pairwise key between node i and node j. Fig. 1 illustrates how the pairwise key
Kij = Kji is generated. To carry out the above computation, nodes i and j should be able
to compute Kij and Kji, respectively. This can be easily achieved using the following key
pre-distribution scheme, for k = 1, . . . , N :
(1) store the kth row of matrix A at node k, and
(2) store the kth column of matrix G at node k.3
Therefore, when nodes i and j need to establish pairwise key, they first exchange their
columns of G and then they can compute Kij and Kji, respectively, using their private
rows of A. Because G is public information, its columns can be transmitted in plaintext.
It has been shown [Blom 1985] that the above scheme is λ-secure if any λ+ 1 columns of
G are linearly independent. This λ-secure property guarantees that no coalition of up to λ
nodes other than i and j can compute Kij or Kji.
An Example of Matrix G
We show an example of matrix G. Note that any λ + 1 columns of G must be linearly
independent in order to achieve the λ-secure property. Since each pairwise key is repre-
sented by an element in the finite field GF (q), we must set |q| to be larger than the key size
we desire. Thus, if 64-bit keys are desired we may choose q as the smallest prime number
larger than 264 (alternately, we may choose q = 264); note that for all reasonable values of
N we will have q > N as required. Let s be a primitive element of GF (q); that is, each
nonzero element in GF (q) can be represented by some power of s. A feasible G can be
3We will show later that a sensor need not store the whole column, because each column can be generated from
a single field element.
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Fig. 1. Generating Keys in Blom’s Scheme
designed as follows [MacWilliams and Sloane 1977]:
G =

1 1 1 · · · 1
s s2 s3 · · · sN
s2 (s2)2 (s3)2 · · · (sN )2
.
.
.
sλ (s2)λ (s3)λ · · · (sN )λ
 .
It is well-known that si 6= sj if i 6= j mod q (this is a property of primitive elements).
Since G is a Vandermonde matrix, it can be shown that any λ+1 columns of G are linearly
independent when s, s2, s3, . . . , sN are all distinct [MacWilliams and Sloane 1977]. In
practice, G can be generated by the primitive element s of GF (q). Therefore, when we
store the kth column of G at node k, we only need to store the seed sk at this node, and
any node can regenerate the column given the seed. Tradeoffs between memory usage and
computational complexity will be discussed later in the paper.
4. MULTIPLE-SPACE KEY PRE-DISTRIBUTION SCHEME
To achieve better resilience against node capture, we propose a new key pre-distribution
scheme that uses Blom’s method as a building block. Our idea is based on the following
observations: Blom’s method guarantees that any pair of nodes can establish a shared
secret key. If we imagine a graph in which each sensor node is a vertex and there is an
edge between nodes only if they can establish a shared key, then Blom’s scheme results in
a complete graph (i.e., and edge exists between all node pairs). Although full connectivity
is desirable, it is not necessary. To achieve our goal of key agreement, all we need is a
connected graph, rather than a complete graph. Previous work shows that by requiring the
graph to be connected rather than complete, the information stored by each sensor node
can be reduced.
Before we describe our proposed scheme, we define a key space (or space in short)
as a pair of matrices (D,G) as defined in Blom’s scheme. We say a node picks a key
space (D,G) if the node carries the secret information generated from (D,G) using Blom’s
scheme. Two nodes can calculate pairwise key if they have picked a common key space.
4.1 Key Pre-Distribution Phase
During the key pre-distribution phase, we need to assign key information to each node,
such that after deployment, neighboring sensor nodes can establish a shared, secret key.
Assume that each sensor node has a unique identity, whose range is from 1 to N . We also
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select the parameters τ, ω, and λ, where 2 ≤ τ < ω. These parameters determine the
security and performance of our scheme, as will be discussed later in the paper. Our key
generation/distribution phase consists of the following steps:
Step 1: Generating G matrix. We first select a primitive element from a finite field
GF (q), where |q| is larger than the desired key length (and also q > N ), to create a
generator matrix G of size (λ + 1) × N . Let G(j) represent the jth column of G. We
provide G(j) to node j. As we have already shown in Section 3, although G(j) contains
(λ + 1) elements, each sensor only needs to store one field element (the second element
of the column), which can be used to regenerate all the elements in G(j). Therefore the
memory usage for storing G(j) at a node is just a single element. Since the seed is unique
for each sensor node, it can also be used as a node identity.
Step 2: Generating D matrices. We generate ω random, symmetric matrices D1,. . ., Dω
of size (λ+1)× (λ+1). We call each tuple Si = (Di, G) (for i = 1, . . . , ω), a key space.
We then compute the matrix Ai = (Di ·G)T . Let Ai(j) represent the jth row of Ai.
Step 3: Selecting τ spaces. We randomly select τ distinct key spaces from the ω key
spaces for each node. For each space Si selected by node j, we store the jth row of Ai (i.e.
Ai(j)) at this node. This information is secret; under no circumstance should a node send
this information to any other node. According to Blom’s scheme, two nodes can establish
a common secret key if they have both picked a common key space.
Since Ai is an N × (λ+1) matrix, Ai(j) consists of (λ+1) elements. Therefore, each
node needs to store (λ+ 1)τ elements in its memory. Because the length of each element
is (roughly) the same as the length of the secret keys, the memory usage of each node is
(λ+ 1)τ times the length of the key (we do not count the space required to store the seed
for G(j), since this may serve as the node identity).
4.2 Key Agreement Phase
After deployment, each node needs to discover whether it shares any space with its neigh-
bors. To do this, each node broadcasts a message containing the following information:
(1) the node’s id, (2) the indices of the spaces it carries,4 and (3) the seed of the column of
G it carries.5
Assume that nodes i and j are neighbors, and they have received the above broadcast
messages. If they find out that they have a common space, say Sc, they can compute their
pairwise secret key using Blom’s scheme: Initially node i has Ac(i) and seed for G(i), and
node j has Ac(j) and seed for G(j). After exchanging the seeds, node i can regenerate
G(j) and node j can regenerate G(i); then the pairwise secret key between nodes i and j,
Kij = Kji, can be computed in the following manner by these two nodes independently:
Kij = Kji = Ac(i) ·G(j) = Ac(j) ·G(i).
After secret keys with neighbors are set up, the entire sensor network forms the following
key-sharing graph:
DEFINITION 4.1. (Key-sharing graph) Let V represent all the nodes in the sensor net-
4If we are concerned about disclosing the indices of the spaces each node carries, we can use the challenge-
response technique to avoid sending the indices [Chan et al. 2003].
5As mentioned earlier, we could also let the node identity be the same as the seed.
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work. A key-sharing graph Gks(V,E) is constructed in the following manner: For any two
nodes i and j in V , there exists an edge between them if and only if (1) nodes i and j have
at least one common key space, and (2) nodes i and j can reach each other (i.e., are within
wireless transmission range).
We now show how two neighboring nodes, i and j who do not share a common key
space could still establish a shared secret key. The idea is to use the secure channels that
have already been established in the key-sharing graph Gks: as long as Gks is connected,
two neighboring nodes i and j can always find a path in Gks from i to j. Assume that the
path is i, v1, . . ., vt, j. To establish a common secret key between i and j, node i first
generates a random key K. Then i sends the key to v1 using their secure link; v1 sends the
key to v2 using the secure link between v1 and v2, and so on until j receives the key from
vt. Nodes i and j use this secret key K as their pairwise key. Because the key is always
forwarded over a secure link, no nodes beyond this path can determine the key.
4.3 Computing ω, τ , and Memory Usage
As we have just shown, to make it possible for any pair of nodes to be able to find a secret
key between them, the key sharing graph Gks(V,E) needs to be connected. Given the size
and the density of a network, how can we select the values for ω and τ such that the graph
Gks is connected with high probability? We use the following three-step approach, which
is adapted from [Eschenauer and Gligor 2002]. Although this approach is heuristic and
not rigorous, it has been suggested and used in previous work in this area [Eschenauer and
Gligor 2002; Chan et al. 2003].
Step 1: Computing required local connectivity. Let Pc be the probability that the key-
sharing graph is connected. We call it global connectivity. We use local connectivity
to refer to the probability of two neighboring nodes sharing at least one space (i.e., the
probability they can establish a common key). The global connectivity and the local con-
nectivity are related: to achieve a desired global connectivity Pc, the local connectivity
must be higher than a certain value; we call this value the required local connectivity, and
denote it by prequired.
Using results from the theory of random graphs [Erdo˝s and Re´nyi 1959], we can relate
the average node degree d (i.e., the average number of edges connected to each node) to
the global connectivity probability Pc for a network of size N (for N large):
d =
(N − 1)
N
[ln(N)− ln(− ln(Pc))] . (1)
For a given density of sensor network deployment, let n be the expected number of neigh-
bors within wireless communication range of a node. Since the expected node degree
should be at least d as calculated above, the required local connectivity prequired can be
estimated as:
prequired =
d
n
. (2)
We stress that this only guarantees connectivity in a heuristic (and not a rigorous) sense:
to apply the theory of random graphs it must be the case that a node has edges with other
nodes uniformly distributed throughout the graph. Here, however, nodes only have edges
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to their physically-close neighbors. Yet, we are not aware of any problems in practice with
using this heuristic estimate.
Step 2: Computing actual local connectivity. After we have selected values for ω and τ ,
the actual local connectivity is determined by these values. We use pactual to represent the
actual local connectivity, namely pactual is the actual probability of any two neighboring
nodes sharing at least one space (i.e., the probability that they can establish a common
key). Since pactual = 1− Pr(two nodes do not share any space),
pactual = 1−
(
ω
τ
)(
ω−τ
τ
)(
ω
τ
)2 = 1− ((ω − τ)!)2(ω − 2τ)!ω! . (3)
The values of pactual have been plotted in Fig. 2 when ω varies from τ to 100 and τ =
2, 4, 6, 8. For example, one can see that, when τ = 4, the value of ω must be at most 25 in
order to achieve local connectivity pactual ≥ 0.5.
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Fig. 2. Probability of sharing at least one key when two nodes each randomly chooses τ spaces from ω spaces.
The collection of sets of spaces assigned to each sensor form a probabilistic quorum
system [Malkhi et al. 2001]: the desire is that every two sensors have a space in common
with high probability. Next we show that if τ ≥
√
ln 11−pactual
√
ω, then the probability
of intersection is at least pactual. For example, when τ ≥
√
ln 2
√
ω, the probability of
intersection is at least 1/2. This helps explain the behavior evidence in Fig. 2. A proof
of this fact, similar to proof of the “birthday paradox”, is as follows: It is well-known that
1− x ≤ e−x for all x ≥ 0. Therefore,
pactual = 1− ((ω − τ)!)
2
(ω − 2τ)!ω!
= 1−
(
1− τ
ω
)(
1− τ
ω − 1
)
· · ·
(
1− τ
ω − τ + 1
)
≥ 1− e−( τω+ τω−τ+···+ τω−τ+1 )
≥ 1− e− τ
2
ω .
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Accordingly, we have
τ ≤
√
ln
1
1− pactual
√
ω.
Thus, the value of τ to achieve pactual (for given ω) is at most
√
ln 11−pactual
√
ω.
Step 3: Computing ω and τ . Knowing the required local connectivity prequired and the
actual local connectivity pactual, in order to achieve the desired global connectivity Pc, we
should have pactual ≥ prequired. Thus:
1− ((ω − τ)!)
2
(ω − 2τ)!ω! ≥
(N − 1)
nN
[ln(N)− ln(− ln(Pc))] . (4)
Therefore, in order to achieve a certain Pc for a network of size N and the expected
number of neighbors for each node being n, we just need to find values of ω and τ such
that Inequality (4) is satisfied.
Step 4: Computing memory usage. According to Blom’s scheme, a node needs to store
a row from an N × (λ + 1) matrix (D · G)T ; therefore, for each selected space, a node
needs to carry λ+ 1 elements; Hence the total memory usage m for each node is:
m = (λ+ 1)τ. (5)
(As mentioned earlier, we do not count the field element needed to generate G(i) since this
can also serve as the node identity.)
5. SECURITY ANALYSIS
We evaluate the multiple-space key pre-distribution scheme in terms of its resilience against
node capture. Our evaluation is based on two metrics: (1) When x nodes are captured,
what is the probability that at least one key space is broken? This analysis shows when the
network starts to become insecure. (2) When x nodes are captured, what fraction of the
additional communication (i.e., communication among uncaptured nodes) also becomes
compromised? This analysis shows the expected payoff an adversary obtains after captur-
ing a certain number of nodes.
5.1 Probability of At Least One Space Being Broken
We define the unit of memory size as the size of a secret key (e.g., 64 bits). In Blom’s
scheme, for a space to be λ-secure, each node needs to use memory of size λ+1. Therefore,
if the memory usage is m and each node needs to carry τ spaces, the value of λ should be
bmτ c − 1. We use this value for λ in the following analysis.
Let Si be the event that space Si is broken (for i = 1, . . . , ω), and let Cx be the event
that x nodes are compromised in the network. Furthermore, let Si ∪ Sj be the joint event
that either space Si or space Sj , or both, is broken and let θ = τω . Hence, we have
Pr(at least one space is broken | Cx) = Pr(S1 ∪ S2 ∪ · · · ∪ Sω | Cx).
According to the Union Bound,
Pr(S1 ∪ · · · ∪ Sω | Cx) ≤
ω∑
i=1
Pr(Si | Cx).
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Due to the fact that each key space is broken with equal probability,
ω∑
i=1
Pr(Si | Cx) = ωPr(S1 | Cx).
Therefore,
Pr(at least one space is broken | Cx)
≤
ω∑
i=1
Pr(Si | Cx) = ωPr(S1 | Cx). (6)
We now need to calculate Pr(S1 | Cx), the probability of space S1 being compromised
when x nodes are compromised. Because each node carries information from τ spaces, the
probability that each compromised node carries information about S1 is θ = τω . Therefore,
after x nodes are compromised, the probability that exactly j of these x nodes contain
information about S1 is
(
x
j
)
θj(1− θ)x−j . Since space S1 can be broken only after at least
λ+ 1 nodes are compromised (by the λ-secure property of the underlying Blom scheme),
we have the following result:
Pr(S1 | Cx) =
x∑
j=λ+1
(
x
j
)
θj(1− θ)x−j . (7)
Combining Inequality (6) and Equation (7), we have the following upper bound:
Pr(at least one space is broken | Cx)
≤ ω
x∑
j=λ+1
(
x
j
)
θj(1− θ)x−j
= ω
x∑
j=λ+1
(
x
j
)( τ
ω
)j (
1− τ
ω
)x−j
. (8)
We plot both simulation and analytical results in Fig. 3. From the figure, the two results
match each other closely, meaning that the union bound works quite well in the scenarios
we discuss. Fig. 3 shows, for example, that when the memory usage is set to 200, ω is set
to 50, and τ is set to 4, the value of λ for each space is 49 = b 2004 c − 1, but an adversary
needs to capture about 380 nodes in order to be able to break at least one key space with
reasonably-high probability.
Authentication Property. Due to the property of Blom’s scheme, all keys generated in a
space are pairwise keys. Therefore, when the space is not yet compromised, keys in this
space can be used directly for authentication (note, however, that this will not guarantee
secure pairwise authentication in the sense of Section 2). After a space is broken, however,
an adversary can generate all the pairwise keys in that space, and keys in that space can no
longer be used for authentication purposes.
5.2 The Fraction of Network Communication that is Compromised
To understand the resilience of our key pre-distribution scheme, we need to find out how the
capture of x sensor nodes by an adversary affects the rest of the network. In particular, we
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Fig. 3. The probability of at least one key space being compromised by the adversary when the adversary has
captured x nodes (m = 200, ω = 50). p in the figure represents pactual.
want to find out the fraction of additional communication (i.e., communication among the
uncaptured nodes) that an adversary can compromise based on the information retrieved
from the x captured nodes. To compute this fraction, we first compute the probability that
any one of the additional communication links is compromised after x nodes are captured.
Note that we only consider the links in the key-sharing graph, and each of these links is
secured using a pairwise key computed from the common key space shared by the two
nodes of this link. We should also notice that after the key setup stage, two neighboring
nodes can use the established secure links to agree upon another random key to secure
their communication. Because this key is not generated from any key space, the security
of this new random key does not directly depend on whether the key spaces are broken.
However, if an adversary can record all the communications during the key setup stage,
he/she can still compromise this new key after compromising the corresponding links in
the key-sharing graph.
Let c be a link in the key-sharing graph between two uncompromised nodes, and K be
the communication key used for this link. Let Bi represent the joint event that K belongs
to space Si and space Si is compromised. We use K ∈ Si to represent that “K belongs to
space Si”. The probability of c being broken given x nodes are compromised is:
Pr(c is broken | Cx) = Pr(B1 ∪ B2 ∪ · · · ∪ Bω | Cx).
Since c can only use one key, events B1, . . . , Bω are mutually exclusive. Therefore,
Pr(c is broken | Cx) =
ω∑
i=1
Pr(Bi | Cx) = ωPr(B1 | Cx),
because all events Bi are equally likely. Note that
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Pr(B1 | Cx) = Pr((K ∈ S1) ∩ (S1 is compromised) ∩ Cx)Pr(Cx) .
Since the event (K ∈ S1) is independent of the event Cx or the event (S1 is compromised),
Pr(B1 | Cx) = Pr(K ∈ S1) · Pr(S1 is compromised ∩ Cx)Pr(Cx)
= Pr(K ∈ S1) · Pr(S1 is compromised | Cx).
Pr(S1 is compromised | Cx) can be calculated by Equation (7). The probability that K
belongs to space S1 is the probability that link c uses a key from space S1. Since the choice
of a space from ω key spaces is equally probable, we have:
Pr(K ∈ S1) = Pr(the link c uses a key from space S1) = 1
ω
.
Therefore,
Pr(c is broken | Cx)
= ωPr(B1 | Cx) = ω · 1
ω
· Pr(S1 is compromised | Cx)
= Pr(S1 is compromised | Cx)
=
x∑
j=λ+1
(
x
j
)( τ
ω
)j (
1− τ
ω
)x−j
. (9)
Assume that there are γ secure communication links that do not involve any of the x
compromised nodes. Given the probabilityPr(c is broken | Cx), we know that the expected
fraction of broken communication links among those γ links is
γ · Pr(c is broken | Cx)
γ
= Pr(c is broken | Cx)
= Pr(S1 is compromised | Cx). (10)
The above equation indicates that, given that x nodes are compromised, the fraction of
the compromised secure communication links outside of those x compromised nodes is
the same as the probability of one space being compromised. This follows directly from
the linearity of expectations.
5.2.1 Comparison. Fig. 4 compares our scheme (the one with solid lines) with the
Chan-Perrig-Song scheme (q = 2, q = 3) and the Eschenauer-Gligor scheme (q = 1). The
figure clearly shows the advantages of our scheme. For example, in both the Chan-Perrig-
Song and Eschenauer-Gligor schemes, when m = 200 and pactual = 0.33 an adversary
needs to compromise less than 100 nodes in order to compromise 10% of the links. In
our scheme, however, the adversary needs to compromise 500 nodes before compromising
10% of the links. Therefore, our scheme quite substantially lowers the initial payoff to
the adversary for smaller-scale network breaches. Chan, Perrig, and Song also proposed
a modification of their scheme using multipath key reinforcement to improve the secu-
rity [Chan et al. 2003]. The same technique can be applied to our scheme to improve the
security as well; we leave further comparison to our future work.
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(a) m = 200, pactual = 0.33
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Fig. 4. The figures show the probability that a specific random communication link be-
tween two random nodes i, j is compromised after an adversary has captured x nodes, not
including i or j. The variable m denotes the memory usage (where the unit of memory is
the length of a shared key), and pactual denotes the probability that a random pair of nodes
can establish a secure link.
In Blom’s scheme, when m = 200 the network is perfectly secure if less than 200 nodes
are compromised, but is completely compromised as soon as 200 nodes are compromised
(pactual is always equal to 1 in Blom’s scheme).
5.2.2 Further Analysis. Even though Equation (9) can be used for numerical computa-
tion, it is too complicated to figure out the relationship between x, m, ω, and τ . According
to the results shown in Fig. 4, there is a small range of x where the fraction of the compro-
mised secure communication links increases exponentially with respect to x. We develop
an analytical form to estimate this range. It should be noted that Equation (9) is the tail of
the binomial distribution. Therefore, using the bound on the tail of the binomial distribu-
tion [Peterson 1972], we can derive the following theorem regarding that range.
THEOREM 5.1. Assume that λ = mτ À 1, s.t. λ+ 1 ≈ λ. Define the entropy function
of y, 0 ≤ y ≤ 1, as H(y) = −y ln y − (1− y) ln(1− y) and H ′(y) = dH(y)/dy. For all
x ≥ λ+ 1,
1
2
√
xα(1− α)e
−xE(α,θ) ≤
x∑
j=λ+1
(
x
j
)
θj(1− θ)x−j ,
where α = λ+1x , θ =
τ
ω , and E(α, θ) = H(θ) + (α− θ)H ′(θ)−H(α). Furthermore, if
x <
mω
τ2
, (11)
then
x∑
j=λ+1
(
x
j
)
θj(1− θ)x−j ≤ e−xE(α,θ).
PROOF. Assume that x ≥ λ+ 1. According to the bound on the tail of binomial distri-
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bution [Peterson 1972], Equation (9) can be bounded as follows:
1
2
√
xα(1− α)α
−αx(1− α)−(1−α)xθαx(1− θ)(1−α)x ≤
x∑
j=λ+1
(
x
j
)
θj(1− θ)x−j
and if α > θ, then
x∑
j=λ+1
(
x
j
)
θj(1− θ)x−j ≤ α−αx(1− α)−(1−α)xθαx(1− θ)(1−α)x, (12)
where α = λ+1x and θ =
τ
ω . Since λ =
m
τ À 1, λ+ 1 ≈ λ. Consequently, α ≈ λx = mτx .
By taking the logarithm of the upper bound of Inequality (12) and multiplying by − 1x , we
have
− 1
x
ln
(
α−αx(1− α)−(1−α)xθαx(1− θ)(1−α)x
)
= −H(α)− α ln θ − (1− α) ln(1− θ)
= −H(α) +H(θ) + (θ − α) ln θ + [(1− θ)− (1− α)] ln(1− θ)
= −H(α) +H(θ) + (α− θ)(− ln θ + ln(1− θ)).
Since H ′(y) = dH(y)/dy = ln(1− y)− ln y,
− 1
x
ln
(
α−αx(1− α)−(1−α)xθαx(1− θ)(1−α)x
)
= E(α, θ)
where
E(α, θ) = H(θ) + (α− θ)H ′(θ)−H(α).
Finally,
α > θ ⇐⇒ m
xτ
>
τ
ω
⇐⇒ x < mω
τ2
, (13)
giving the claimed result.
According to [Peterson 1972],E(α, θ) < 0when x > mωτ2 . So, when x > mωτ2 , the lower
bound indicates that the tail of the binomial distribution increases exponentially with re-
spect to x. It is also true thatE(α, θ) > 0 when Inequality (11) is satisfied [Peterson 1972].
The upper bound indicates that the tail of the binomial distribution can be exponentially
bounded away from 1 when x is not close to mωτ2 . For example, when x is 25% away from
mω
τ2 (i.e., x = 0.75 ∗ mωτ2 = 413) and m = 200, τ = 2, and ω = 11, then the upper bound
is e−5.089 = 0.006, which is two orders of magnitude smaller than 1. Hence, mωτ2 can be
used as an estimation (upper bound) on the value of x where the fraction of compromised
links increases exponentially with respect to x. So the adversary can obtain higher payoff
when the number of nodes it compromises is close to mωτ2 . The results shown in Fig. 4
verify that this estimation is quite accurate.
Based on the above discussion, the number of nodes an adversary needs to compromise
to gain a significant payoff is linearly related to the amount of the memory used when ω
and τ are fixed. That is, if the probability of any two nodes sharing at least one space,
pactual, is fixed, then increasing the memory space at each node linearly increases the
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degree of security. For fixed memory usage, the security is linearly related to ωτ2 . Since
ω and τ are related to pactual, one should choose those values of ω and τ that satisfy the
requirement on global connectivity and at the same time yield the largest value of ωτ2 . For
example, by using Inequality (4), one may find all pairs (ω, τ) satisfying the requirement
on the global connectivity. Among all the pairs, the one with the largest value of ωτ2 gives
the best security.
6. OVERHEAD ANALYSIS
6.1 Communication Overhead
According to our previous discussions, the probability pactual that two neighbor nodes
share a key space is less than 1. When two neighboring nodes are not connected directly,
they need to find a path (in the key-sharing graph) to connect to each other. In this section,
we investigate the number of hops required on this path for various parameters of our
scheme. When the two neighbors are connected directly, the number of hops needed to
connect them is obviously 1. When more hops are needed to connect two neighbor nodes,
the communication overhead of setting up the security association between them is higher.
Let ph(`) be the probability that the smallest number of hops needed to connect two
neighboring nodes is `. Obviously, ph(1) is pactual. For ph(2), the third node connecting
these two nodes must be in the overlapped region of the transmission range of node i and
node j, as shown in Fig. 5.
 
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Fig. 5. Overlap Region Aoverlap(z)
The size of this overlapped region is:
Aoverlap(z) = 2r2 cos−1
( z
2r
)
− z ·
√
r2 −
(z
2
)2
, (14)
where r is the transmission range of each node. The total number of nodes in the overlap
region is:
Noverlap(z) =
n
pir2
Aoverlap(z),
where n is the total number of sensor nodes in the transmission range of a sensor node.
We then calculate ph(2, z), the probability that i and j are not connected directly but
there exists at least a common neighbor connecting them, given that the distance between
i and j is z:
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ph(2, z) = (1− pactual)[1− p2,1(z)]
where p2,1(z) is the probability that none of the common neighbors of i and j is connected
to both of them given that i and j are not connected.
The value of ph(2) can be calculated as the average of ph(2, z) throughout all the possi-
ble values of z:
ph(2) =
∫ r
0
f(z)p(2, z)dz
where f(z) is the Probability Density Function (PDF) of z:
f(z) =
∂F (Z)
∂z
=
∂ [Pr(Z ≤ z)]
∂z
=
∂
∂z
[
piz2
pir2
]
=
2z
r2
.
A similar approach may be used to calculate ph(3). The only difference is that, in the
case of ph(3), we need to find the probability that two nodes, nodes u and v, that are
neighboring to nodes i and j, respectively, should provide a secure link between nodes i
and j, as shown in Fig. 6.
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Fig. 6. Overlap Region for ph(3)
We provide the full derivations of ph(2) and ph(3) in Appendix A. The final results are
as follows:
ph(2) = (1− pactual)
·
1− 2
∫ 1
0
yp
n
pi
[
2cos−1( y2 )−y·
√
1−( y2 )
2
]
2,2 dy

ph(3) ≈ [1− ph(1)− ph(2)]
[
1− 2
∫ 1
0
z
· (p˜3,2)
∫ 2pi
0
∫ 1
0
n2
pi2
[
2cos−1( x2 )−x
√
1−( x2 )
2
]
dydθ
dz
]
where
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Fig. 7. Distribution on the number of hops required to connect neighbors (ω = 50)
.
p2,2 = 1−
(
ω−τ
τ
) [(
ω
τ
)− 2(ω−ττ )+ (ω−2ττ )](
ω
τ
)2
p˜3,2 ≈ 1−
(
ω−τ
τ
)(
ω
τ
)3 · τ−1∑
a=1
τ−1∑
b=1
τ−max(a,b)∑
c=1
(
τ
a
)(
τ
b
)(
ω − 2τ
c
)
·
(
ω − 2τ − c
τ − a− c
)(
ω − 2τ − (τ − a)
τ − b− c
)
x =
√
y2 + z2 + 2yz cos(θ).
We plot the values of ph(1), ph(2), and ph(3) in Fig. 7. From these figures, we can
observe that ph(1) + ph(2) ≈ 1 when τ is large (i.e., the probability that at most 2 hops
are required is essentially 1).
6.2 Computational Overhead
As indicated in Section 3, it is necessary for nodes to calculate the common keys by using
the corresponding columns of matrix G. If the Vandermonde matrix is chosen as the G
matrix, the dominating computation cost in our scheme is due to 2λ − 1 multiplications
in the field GF (q): λ − 1 come from the need to regenerate the corresponding column
of G from a seed, while the other λ come from the inner product of the corresponding
row of (DG)T with this column of G. Note that this can easily be reduced to only λ
multiplications using Horner’s rule for polynomial evaluation. (Although O(λ) additions
in GF (q) are also necessary, these are dominated by the field multiplications.)
To analyze the computational overhead of these modular multiplications, we compare
our computation with the RSA public key encryption algorithm, whose cost makes it un-
suitable for sensor networks. We show that the energy consumption of the modular multi-
plications in our scheme is far less than that of RSA. This is due to two factors: λ is small
and the block size is small.
According to Equation (5), when m = 200 and τ = 4, λ is about 50; the total number
of multiplications is then roughly 100 (this assumes a naive implementation which does
not apply Horner’s rule). If we choose 64 bits as the size of a secret key, then our mod-
ular multiplications are 64-bit computations. In total, then, we need roughly 100 64-bit
modular multiplications. For the RSA signature scheme using a 1024-bit modulus, the
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length of the private exponent usually needs to be roughly 1024 bits as well. Thus, a single
exponentiation requires approximately 1500 multiplications. Moreover, a single multipli-
cation modulo a 1024-bit integer is roughly ( 102464 )
2 = 256 times more expensive than a
single multiplication modulo a 64-bit number. Therefore, computing an RSA signature
is roughly 256 ∗ 1500100 = 3840 times more expensive than deriving a shared key in our
scheme. Assuming that the energy cost is proportional to the number of multiplications,
the cost of our scheme is about 13840 that of RSA. In a mid-range processor such as the
Motorola MC68328 “DragonBall” (see [Carman et al. 2000]), the cost of our scheme is
only 25 times more expensive than a 128-bit AES block cipher evaluation (AES is consid-
ered as very energy-efficient); i.e., the computational cost of our scheme is equivalent to
encrypting a 3200-bit message using AES.
Moreover, we mention two simple ways to improve the efficiency of our scheme. First,
note that generating the necessary column of G need only be done once by each node;
that is, node i can generate G(i) once (at the outset of the key-establishment phase) and
then broadcast this column to each node with whom it desires to establish a common key.
This reduces the amortized cost of establishing a key to only λ multiplications (this is
an improvement if Horner’s rule is not used above); this can also be further optimized if
it is expected that nodes will need to compute a large number of shared keys. Second,
to derive 64-bit keys it is not necessary work over a single field GF (q) with |q| ≥ 64;
instead, one can define the key as the concatenation of four “sub-keys” that each lie in a
field GF (q) with |q| ≥ 16. (For example, a single key space over GF (264) can be mapped
to four independent key spaces over GF (216). This assumes 216 > N .) This will be more
efficient since 4λ multiplications in a 16-bit field are more efficient than λ multiplications
in a 64-bit field. The key observation is that security is not affected by working overGF (q)
where q is “small”; this is because our security arguments are information-theoretic and do
not rely on any “cryptographic hardness” of the field GF (q).
7. IMPROVING SECURITY USING TWO-HOP NEIGHBORS
In this section we describe a way to further improve the security of our key pre-distribution
scheme. Based on Inequality (4), we have
1− (1− τ
ω
)(1− τ
ω − 1) · · · (1−
τ
ω − τ + 1)
≥ (N − 1)
nN
(ln(N)− ln(− ln(Pc))). (15)
Notice that the left side is smaller when ω is larger, and the right side is smaller when
n is larger when other parameters are fixed. Therefore, when the network size N , the
global connectivity Pc, and τ are fixed, we can select a larger ω if the expected number
of neighbors n increases while still satisfying the above inequality. We know immediately
from Inequality (11) that the larger the value of ω is, the more resilient the network will
be. Therefore, increasing n can lead to security improvement.
There are two ways to increase n for an existing sensor network: the first is to increase
the communication range, but this also increases energy consumption. The second way is
to use two-hop neighbors. A two-hop neighbor of node v is a node that can be reached
via one of v’s one-hop (or direct) neighbors. To send a message to a two-hop neighbor,
v needs to ask its direct neighbor to forward the message. Since the intermediate node
only forwards the message and does not need to read the contents of the message, there
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is no need to establish a secure channel between the sender and the intermediate node, or
between the intermediate node and the two-hop neighbor. As long as the sender and its
two-hop neighbor can establish a secure channel, the communication between them will
be secured.
If two nodes, i and j, are two-hop neighbors and both of them carry key information from
a common key space, they can find a secret key between themselves using the following
approach: First, they find an intermediate node I that is a neighbor to both of them. Nodes
i and j then exchange their identities and public part of key space information via I . Then,
i and j find a common key space, and compute their secret key in that common key space.
i and j can then encrypt any future communication between themselves using this secret
key. Although all future communication still needs to go through an intermediate node,
e.g., I , the intermediate node cannot decrypt the message because it does not have the key.
After all direct neighbors and two-hop neighbors have established secure channels among
themselves, the entire network forms an Extended Key-Sharing Graph Geks, in which two
nodes are connected by an edge if there is a secure channel between them, i.e. these
two nodes (1) have at least one common key space, and (2) are either direct neighbors
or two-hop neighbors. Once we have formed the Geks, key agreement between any pair
of two neighboring nodes i and j can be performed based on Geks in the same way as it
is performed based on the original Key-Sharing Graph Gks. The difference between this
scheme and the Gks-based key agreement scheme is that in the Geks-based key agreement
scheme, some edges along a secure path might be an edge between two-hop neighbors,
thus forwarding is needed.
7.1 Security Improvement
Security can be improved significantly if key agreement is based on Geks. When we treat
a two-hop neighbor as a neighbor, the radius of the range covered by a node doubles,
so the area that a node can cover is increased by four times. Therefore, the expected
number of neighbors n′ for each node in Geks is about four times as large as that in Gks.
According to Equations (1) and (2), to achieve the same connectivity Pc as that of Gks,
the value of prequired for Geks is one fourth of the value of prequired for Gks. Thus,
the value of pactual for Geks is one fourth of the value of pactual for Gks. As we have
already shown, when τ is fixed, the larger the value of ω is, the smaller the value of pactual
is. For example, assuming a network size N = 10, 000 and the desirable connectivity
Pc = 0.99999, if we fix τ = 2, we need to select ω = 7 for the Gks-based key agreement
scheme; however, using Geks-based scheme, we can select ω = 31. The security of the
latter scheme is improved significantly. By using Equation (11), there is about 31/7(≈
4.5) times security improvement of the two-hop-neighbor scheme over the basic 1-hop-
neighbor scheme. Using Equation (9), we plot the security property of the above two cases
in Fig. 8.
7.2 Overhead Analysis
Such security improvement does come with a cost. If the length (the total number of
edges) of a path between two nodes in Geks is `, the actual number of hops along this path
is larger than ` because some edges in Geks connect two two-hop neighbors. For each
node, the number of two-hop neighbors on the average is three times the number of one-
hop neighbors if nodes are uniformly distributed. Therefore, assuming that the probability
of selecting a two-hop edge and a one-hop edge is the same, for a path of length `, the
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Fig. 8. Comparison: The left curve uses the 1-hop-neighbor scheme (with ω = 7 and τ = 2), and the right
curve uses the 2-hop-neighbor scheme (with ω = 31, and τ = 2). Both figures achieve the same desirable global
connectivity Pc = 0.99999.
expected actual length is 34 ∗ 2` + 14 ∗ ` = 1.75` (note: in practice, we can achieve better
than 1.75` because we usually prefer the one-hop edge if both a one-hop edge and a two-
hop edge are candidates for a secure path). Let p′h(`) be the ph(`) value of the two-hop-
neighbor scheme and let p′′h(`) be the ph(`) value of the basic scheme (only using direct
neighbors); assume the maximum length of the shortest path between two neighbors is L.
Therefore, the ratio between the overhead of the two-hop-neighbor scheme and that of the
basic scheme can be estimated using the following formula:
Relative Overhead = p
′
h(1) +
∑L
`=2 1.75` · p′h(`)∑L
`=1 ` · p′′h(`)
, (16)
where we do not need to multiply first term with 1.75 since if two neighbors share a com-
mon key, then the length of path between them is 1 and is never a two-hop edge. For
example, the overhead ratio of the two schemes used in Fig. 8 is 3.18, namely with 3.18
times more overhead, the resilience can be improved by 4 times. The communication cost
discussed here occurs only during the key setup phase, so it is a one-time cost. The idea of
two-hop neighbors can be extended to multi-hop neighbors, and the security can be further
improved.
8. CONCLUSIONS
We have proposed a framework in which to analyze the security of key pre-distribution
schemes. We hope this framework will be useful to others working in this area. Much
work remains to fully flesh out these definitions, and perhaps to achieve a more efficient
construction of a secure pairwise authentication scheme without relying on the random
oracle model.
We have also presented a new pairwise key pre-distribution scheme for wireless sensor
networks. Our scheme has a number of appealing properties. First, our scheme is scalable
and flexible. For a network that uses 64-bit secret keys, our scheme allows up to N = 264
sensor nodes. These nodes do not need to be deployed at the same time; they can be added
later, and still be able to establish secret keys with existing nodes. Second, compared to
existing key pre-distribution schemes, our scheme is substantially more resilient against
ACM Journal Name, Vol. V, No. N, Month 20YY.
· 25
node capture. Our analysis and simulation results have shown, for example, that to com-
promise 10% of the secure links in the network secured using our scheme, an adversary has
to compromise 5 times as many nodes as he/she has to compromise in a network secured
by Chan-Perrig-Song scheme or Eschenauer-Gligor scheme. Furthermore, we have also
shown that network resilience can be further improved if we use multi-hop neighbors.
We have conducted a thorough analysis of the efficiency of our scheme. We have shown
that when pactual ≥ 0.33, a node can (with very high probability) reach any neighbor
within at most 3 hops. The computational requirements of our scheme are modest. Al-
though our scheme involves modular multiplications, we have shown that the energy cost
in establishing a key is (at worst) about the same as encrypting a 3200-bit message using
AES. We also noted a number of ways to further optimize the computation of our scheme.
APPENDIX
A. CALCULATION OF PH(2) AND PH(3)
We present our calculation of ph(2) and ph(3) in this appendix. We assume the distance
between two nodes i and j is z.
A.1 Calculation of ph(2)
The third node connecting these nodes must be in the overlapped region of the transmission
range of node i and node j, as shown in Fig. 5.
As stated in Equation (14) the size of this overlapped region is:
Aoverlap(z) = 2r2 cos−1
( z
2r
)
− z ·
√
r2 −
(z
2
)2
,
where r is the transmission range of each node.
Since, on the average, each node has n neighbors that are connected to it with wireless
communication, the nodal density inside the transmission range is:
ρ =
n
pir2
.
Thus, the total number of nodes in the overlap region is:
Noverlap(z) = ρAoverlap(z).
Let ph(2, z) be the probability that i and j are not connected directly but there exists at
least a common neighbor connecting them, given that the distance between i and j is z:
ph(2, z) = Pr{[i⇔/ j] ∩ [∃` ∈ Ni ∩Nj s.t. `⇔ i and `⇔ j]}
= Pr{i⇔/ j} · Pr{∃` ∈ Ni ∩Nj s.t. `⇔ i and `⇔ j|i⇔/ j}
= (1− pactual)[1− p2,1(z)]
where Ni and Nj represent the set of nodes that are in range of node i and j, respectively,
p2,1(z) is the probability that none of the common neighbors of i and j is connected to
both of them given that i and j are not connected, and ⇔ means two nodes share at least
one key space (connected). According to independence of key selections on each node,
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p2,1(z) = (p2,2)
Noverlap(z) ,
where p2,2 is the probability that a neighbor node, `, of i and j is not connected to both of
them given that i and j are not connected:
p2,2 = 1−
(
ω
τ
)(
ω−τ
τ
)(
ω
τ
)3 ·{(ωτ
)
− 2
(
ω − τ
τ
)
+
(
ω − 2τ
τ
)}
= 1−
(
ω−τ
τ
) [(
ω
τ
)− 2(ω−ττ )+ (ω−2ττ )](
ω
τ
)2 ,
where
(
ω
τ
)
is the number of ways to select τ keys from ω key spaces for i,
(
ω−τ
τ
)
is the
number of ways to select completely different τ keys for j, and
(
ω
τ
) − 2(ω−ττ ) + (ω−2ττ )
gives the number of ways to select keys for ` such that ` is connected to both i and j.
The PDF of z can be expressed as f(z),
f(z) =
∂F (Z)
∂z
=
∂ [Pr(Z ≤ z)]
∂z
=
∂
∂z
[
piz2
pir2
]
=
2z
r2
,
thus, ph(2) is
ph(2) =
∫ r
0
(1− pactual)2z
r2
[
1− (p2,2)Noverlap(z)
]
dz
= (1− pactual)
1− 2
∫ 1
0
yp
n
pi
[
2 cos−1( y2 )−y·
√
1−( y2 )
2
]
2,2 dy

where we substitute z with y = zr .
A.2 Calculation of ph(3)
ph(3) can be calculated with a similar method. We define ph(3, z) as the probability that
3 hops are needed to connect node i and node j, given that the distance between them is z
(z ≤ r):
ph(3, z) = Pr{[i⇔/ j] ∩ [∀` ∈ Ni ∩Nj ` is not connected to both i and j ] ∩
[∃u ∈ Ni and v ∈ Nj s.t. u⇔ i and v ⇔ j and u⇔ v]}
= [1− ph(1)− ph(2)][1− p3,1(z)]
where 1 − p3,1(z) is the probability that there exists at least a pair of nodes u and v con-
nected to each other and connected to i and j separately, given that i and j are not directly
connected, nor can they be connected through another common neighbor.
The exact calculation of p3,1(z) is complicated. We give an approximation as follows:
For every neighbor v of node j, we find all the possible node u, which may satisfy i ⇔
u⇔ v ⇔ j. We calculate the number of such pairs of (u, v).
Assuming that node v is at location (y, θ) from origin of j, the distance between node v
and i is x:
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x =
√
y2 + z2 + 2yz cos(θ).
Obviously, node u should reside in the shaded area in Fig. 6. The expected number of
nodes residing in the small neighborhood of (y, θ) is ρy · dy · dθ. The number of nodes in
the overlap region of circle i and circle v, Aoverlap(x), can be expressed ρ · Aoverlap(x).
So the total number of pairs of (u, v), given that the distance between i and j is z, is:
N3(z) =
∫ 2pi
0
∫ r
0
ρ2y ·Aoverlap(x) dy dθ
where, similar to Eq. (14), Aoverlap(x) = 2r2 cos−1
(
x
2r
)− x ·√r2 − (x2 )2.
So,
p3,1(z) = (p3,2)
N3(z) (17)
where p3,2 is the probability that for a pair of nodes u ∈ Ni and v ∈ Nj , security con-
nections cannot be made through path i, u, v, and j given that i and j are not directly
connected or through a common neighbor. p3,2 can be estimated6 as follows:
p˜3,2 ≈ 1−
(
ω
τ
)(
ω−τ
τ
)(
ω
τ
)4 · τ−1∑
a=1
τ−1∑
b=1
τ−max(a,b)∑
c=1
(
τ
a
)(
τ
b
)
·
(
ω − 2τ
c
)(
ω − 2τ − c
τ − a− c
)(
ω − 2τ − (τ − a)
τ − b− c
)
(18)
where
(
ω
τ
)
is the number of ways to select τ keys from ω key spaces for i,
(
ω−τ
τ
)
is the
number of ways to select completely different τ keys for j, a represents the number com-
mon keys shared by u and i, b represents the number common keys shared by v and j, c
represents the number common keys shared by u and v,
(
ω−2τ
c
)
gives the number of ways
to select the common keys different to i and j from the pool of key spaces,
(
ω−2τ−c
τ−a−c
)
is the
number of ways to select the τ − a− c keys for u, and (ω−2τ−(τ−a)τ−b−c ) gives the number of
ways to select the τ − b− c keys for v.
Based on the distribution of z, ph(3) is:
ph(3) ≈
∫ r
0
2z
r2
[1− ph(1)− ph(2)]
[
1− (p˜3,2)N3(z)
]
dz.
We substitute x, y, and z with x′ = xr , y
′ = yr , and z
′ = zr . We further simplify our
notation by dropping the primes from these variables. Thus,
ph(3) ≈ [1− ph(1)− ph(2)]
[
1− 2
∫ 1
0
z (p˜3,2)
∫ 2pi
0
∫ 1
0
n2
pi2
[
2 cos−1( x2 )−x
√
1−( x2 )
2
]
dydθ
dz
]
.
6Eq. (18) is an approximation because the probability is obtained by assuming only that node i and j are not
connected.
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